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The scale of deprivation of millions ofpeople deserves
to be, and, if there is justice in the world, will be, the
princinal preoccupation of men of good will throughout
the world..
With bland understatement the Brandt Commission
report points out on page 49:
Few people in the North have any detailed conception
of the extent of poverty in the Third World or of the
forms that it takes.
Iadd, sadly, that too few of those who do seem to care.
Although in the North we face genuine economic
problems, such as inflation or a static standard of
living, we are rich and fortunate by comparison with
those who endure a combination of malnutrition,
illiteracy, disease and low income, which is the daily
reality for too much of the Third World.
Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler
28 March 1980
cols 1843-45
The report, after all, is the beatification of the begging
bowl. We are pauperising some of these countries-
bringing them to mendicancv... I The real service
that we can render to these countries is to get them to
understand that in the end it all depends on them...
lit! is teaching them the lesson that we learntthe
lesson... in Samuel Smiles and many other excellent
writers. A verl' good form of overseas aid would be to
send them a whole lot of copies of Samuel Smiles'
admirable book. Sir Ronald Bell
16 June 1980
cols 1265-66
lAid! is total/from £790 mn last rear to £779 mn in the
new financial i'ear and to £680 mn in 1982-8.?. The
Brandt document talks about the need for the rich
countries of the world to divert more aid to
underdeveloped countries, while the Government plan
a 14 per cent cut in expenditure in the next few i'ears
What are the same Government proposing to
spend on defence? We find that this veai at constant
1979 prices, there will be an expenditure of.L7. 720 mn.
Next rear that will rise to £7. 997 mn. In the following
tear if trill be £8,240 mn. and in the rear after that to
£8.490 mn. That brings us to 1984shades of George
Orwell when we shall spend £8.740 mn. Therefore.
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defence expenditure is to be increased at a rate ot.?
per cent in real terms at a time when there is a cutback
in overseas aid. loan Evans
28 March 1980
col 1887
The Lo,'d Privy Seall said that our own aid performance
compared reasonably well with others. 0f course I
accept that, but that is not the point. The point of the
whole report is the need for a substantial increase in
effort to meet phenomenally difficult new problems.
We cannot escape the whole argument by congratulating
ourselves on a relatively good performance in the
past. Peter Shore
16 June 1980
col 1167
The report calls for a concentration on aid to the
poorest, and the Government have abandoned that
concept. The repoi-t calls forgreater access to technology
and training, but the Government, by their increase in
the fees for overseas students, have barred. many
developing countries from such access. The report
cal/s for greater access to markets, but even in my own
part r there is a growing demand for protectionism.
Not only are we not going as faras the report wants: in
many respects the Govern ment 's policy is going in the
opposite direction... lit isj important to realise that
those of us who support the report are calling for a
reversal of Government policies and of their concept
of the aid and development programme.
Tom McNally
16 June 1980
col 1276
I have argued elsewhere for a new Marshall plan to
meet the problems that we are discussing. In 1947, in
an act of unprecedented generosity and political
wisdomit was not just materialism the United States
gave away 2.5 per cent of her gross national product
over a period of five years to put a war-wea,y and
p&vsicall.v shattered Europe back on its feet, and was
rewarded in due course not only by the recovery of
Europe and tremendous expansion in its productive
capacity but in terms of her own economy as well.
[It has been J argued that the Americans were simply
helping people who has possessed an infrastructure
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and who knew how to run Western business and
operate Western industries but had gone through a
period of misfortune and collapse. True, but I still
argue that there are some developing countries where,
if resources were made available, results could be
achieved in a relatively short time. There are not
many examples, but they exist. Taiwan is an example
of a country that, following a massive infection of
American aid, was ultimately able to cope on its own
and is now one of the great trading countries of the
world. Sir Bernard Brame
16 June 1980
cols 1235-36
One must ask how it is that in the past five yeaiíc the
West has failed to see that North-South interests ai-e
indeed mutual: has again and again failed to respond
to sensible initiatives such as the establishment of a
common fund to give greater stability to raw material
producers: to be more bold with the creation of new
facilities in the ¡MF and the World Bank: and above
all, has failed to stimulate its own economies and to
ri-ans for resources on a progressive scale to the non-oil
countries of the Third World. Indeed, the fui/ui-e is a/l
the moi-e remarkable because in 1974as I well
,-ecall, being then the Secreta,y of State for Trade when
the OECD collectively discussed the new situation
that was affecting the woi-ld economy, it was absolute/i'
clear to all that the deflation of demand in the North
was the wi-on g strategy for the North to pursue.
There is, unhappily. an explanation of this foilure to
act or to i-eact that brings us foce to fece with the
ma/o,- division in political philosophy, not on/v in our
own country but throughout most of the northern
countries. It is the current obsession with inflation,
and an appalling intellectual i-ecidivism into the total/v
disci-edited economic doctrines of the /930s. At the
hea,-t of the now dominant monetam-ist school of
economic theory is the belief that Governments have
not part to pIar in demand cieation and that, on the
contrail', any efforts that they make simpli' exacerbate
the situation that those efforts are designed to remedy.
Approximate/v 35 i'ears ago. in the fomous White
Paper of the war-time coalition Governmentwhose
author was generally reputed to be Joan Maynard
Keines - the following statement was made:
It was at one time believed that every trade depression
would automatically bring its own corrective, since
prices and wages would fall. The falling prices
would bring about an increase in demand and
employment would thus be restored. Experience
has shown, however, that under modern conditions
this process of self-regulation, if effective at all, is
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likely to be extremely prolonged and to be
accompanied with widespread distress, particularly
in a complex industrial society like our own.
That is as true today as it was then.
Three years ago the present Secretaiy of State for
Industiy spoke for the newly dominant fec tion in the
Conservative Party. In flat contradiction, he said:
Post-war conventional wisdom held that by raising
demand the government could generate growth.
But we have ruefully come to recognise that
governments cannot generate growth. Though
governments cannot generate growth, what they
can do is obstruct spontaneous growth.
That is an abdication of responsibility and a rejection
of the great postwar commitment. As the White Paper
of 1944 states:
Government accepts as one of their primary aims
and responsibilities the maintenance of the high and
stable level of employment.
Monetam-ists cannot, therefore, accept the basic message
of the Brandt Commission, namely, the basic mutuality
of intel-est that arises from an abundance of suiplus
capacity in the No,th and despem-ate and unmet human
needs in the South.
Together with deflation, there is serious cost-push
inflation in the Western world. In Britain, the
Govei-nment have done much of the pushing. At the
same time, there is a clear lack of effective demand
and, as a consequence, rapid/v rising unemployment.
Indeed, the Government appear to be so blind to
those realities that they are deliberately planning a fa/l
in output. not just this vea,-, but, discounting No,-th
Sea oil, for four veai's ahead.
The effects will be felt not only in Britain, but in the
world outside. Far from increasing the transfer of
¡-esources to the South. the fall in demand in this
country will inevitably i-educe still further the
oppol-tunities of Thii-d World countries to sell to us.
At the same time, our direct aid pi-ogramme will be
not increased, but cut by about 14 per cent by ¡ 983-84.
Peter Shore
l6June 1980
cols 1170-72
ItI is ini' belief.., that it is the cartelisation of oil
pi-oduction and oil pi'ices that presents the single most
impol-tant i-oad-block to economic pi-o gress.
I sai' that for three reasons. First, in spite of the
massive increase in expenditure and imports. including
arms imports. the oil-producing countries, particular/i'
those in the thinly-inhabited desert countries of the
Middle East, are unable to tui'n their i'astiv increased
revenues into effective demand for goods and ser.'ices.
Secondly, given the dependence of the North on
imported oil, the North as a whole faced, and continues
to face, a ma jorba lance ofpayments deficita situation
that the North proceeded to 'rectify' by deflating
internal demand. Thirdly, and still more serious/v. oil
price increases faced the great mass of Third World
countries with a still more desperate situation. They
have to pay for essential oil imports out of other
revenues which do not grow at a corresponding pace.
The amounts involved by the increase in oil prices
have been enormous. In a single year 1974, the
surplus of the OPEC countries leapt from. I believe, $7
bn to $60 bn. At the same time, the current balance of
the OECD countries chan ged from a surplus of $10 bn
to a deficit of $27 bn, while the non-oil developing
countries plunged from a deficit of $6 bn, to a deficit
of$24bn. Overthefive years 1974-78, even though the
OPEC countries increased their imports. the OPEC
surplus totalled close on $200 bn. That is part of the
size of the problem of recycling and the private
backing of lending.
Oil prices have not, of course, remained static. Year
by year they have increased. In the past year alone,
they have again doubled. I am told that in 1980 oil
prices will be about IS times greater than they were in
1973. The surplus of the OPEC countries is now
estimated... to be running at some $130 bn a year.
This year the threat to the world economy is even
more grave than it has been in the past four or five
years. The borrowing limits. . . of many Third World
countries have already been surpassed. Recycling,
mainly through private Western banks, is beginning to
thy up. Brazil and the Philippines are just two countries,
by no means the least prosperous in the developing
world, that have been unable to obtain private finance
du ring this i'eai
The ¡MF, as recent bitter disputes with Tanzania,
Turkey andJamaica have made plain, is not geared, in
spite of certain additionalfaciities, to lending policies
that will cope with a long-term situation of balance of
payment deficit. Indeed, there are today many countries
whose total export earnings are being absorbed by
essential minimum oil imports plus the servicing of
accumulated debt. It is small wonde, then, that the
Bank of International Settlements in its annual report
this month. . . speaks of the industrial world facing a
long period of 'painfully slow growth:
It is my view that the world is moving from recession
to slump. That is the urgency of this debate and the
urgency of the response that we and others must
make. If lam right, the political consequences cannot
be calculated, but they will certainly be serious. Mounting
unemployment in the countries of the North. the plain
evidence of the capacity to produce wealth but the
inability to organise effective demand for the goods
produced, will not in our generation and time be
accepted with resignation or stoicism. There will be
demands, ever more clamant, for action, and if
democratic governments cannot or will not act there
will be a loss of confidence in democratic institutions
themselves. At the same time, protectionism and
economic nationalism will be powerfully reinforced.
with all the damaging consequences that that will
entail for international relations. Peter Shore
16 June 1980
cots 1168-69
It is no use saying that the countries of the South
should never have got into debt. Look at the size of
our national debt from our national investment. Every
country has a similar problem. The countries of the
South could not foresee, am' more than we could, the
constant increase in oil prices or the enormous height
of interest rates today. There is no point in apportioning
the blame. The problem must be dealt with. The
question is, how to do it.
The big problem is the.. . mostly medium-developed
countries, some of which are big in area, population
and output. For example, Brazil has a total indebtedness
of more than SO bn American dollars. Last year, the
cost of its oil, because of increased prices, and the cost
of servicing its debt, because of increased interest
rates, were more than the value of the whole of its
exports put together. What could Brazil do, except
incur furt her indebtedness, which it did?
This year, if Brazil is to meet the further increase in
the price of oil andthe high interest rates it will have to
increase its exports from ¡4 bn dollars last year to 20
bn dollars this year. How is that country to increase its
exports by 50 per cent in one year? We know the
problem of trying to increase our exports by Spercent
or 6 per cent in a year. If Brazil has falling commodity
prices/or coffee and cocoa, the problem is made that
much more difficult...
The commercial banks, certainly Wall Street and the
major banks in the City, have concluded that they
cannot go further with recycling. The proportion of
recycling in the developing world is as much as the
banks can cari)'. That produces the problem of recycling
the growing surpluses of OPEC.
The even greater problem is that f developing countries
are forced to default the Western banking system will
be in danger That is another direct connection between
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North and South. We cannot say of the developing
countries 'Leave them to themselves, it does not
matter what happens because the banking system is
integral to the survival of the Western world
A fw of us can still remember what happened following
the collapse of the Kredit Anstalt, at the beginning of
the 1930s. and its impact on the rest of the banking
system. It was followed by the Wall Street collapse.
the vea rs of unemployment, the rise of Hitler and the
Second World War If those countries are allowed to
de/ault, the Western banking system and Western
society will suffei
It is not a question of taking action over the next lOor
20 years. We are talking about 1980 and thefirstthree
months of 1981. Action is required urgently. The
banks realise that. Of course, they will not discuss it.
The chairmen of banks in Wall Street or in the City do
not discuss such matters properly. They go on saying
that it will be handled all right. If they do otherwise,
they will increase the difficulties. However, we ought
to know what the problems are, and so ought
governments. Action must be taken within a year, up
to Easter 1981.
That ¿s the last of the major problems, but it is our
problem as well as that of others. When I read the
comment that 'They have their problems and we have
ours 'which appeared in The Sunday Times, I considered
that nothing could be more devastating than for a
British official to make such a remark.
Edward Heath
16 June 1980
cols 1184-85
There is an immediate need to recycle surpluses into
programme lending...
Do we need a new institution? The right hon Member
for Sidcup [Mr Heath] thought not. He would prefer
to rely on the existing institutions of the World Bank
and the IMF. I have always opposed new institutions.
There are plenty of international institutions. However,
this is not a job for the World Bank. According to its
articles, it cannot undertake such work. That leaves
the IMF. The right hon Gentleman seemed to argue
that we should reform the ¡MF so that it could take on
this new job. Ido not think that the ¡MF is capable at
this moment of that degree of radical reform.
Isay nothing now that ¡have not told directors of the
¡ME A number of the developing countriesnot only
Tanzania and Jamaica but Turkey, Portugal, Peru and
Ghana - have run into deep crisis because of shortage
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of foreign exchange caused because they had to face
increased oil prices. They were oil-dependent countries
that had to buy oil: they had nothing else. They had to
face the consequences of our inflation, because they
were also dependent on importing our manufactured
goods and had to face a period of a general decline in
the prices of the basic commodities on which they
relied for their foreign exchange earnings. So they
were in trouble.
The ¡MF formula is universally applied both to developed
and developing countries. It was applied to us. But
there is an important difference. A minister of one
developing country described the IMF formula as a
fourwheeled chariot. It is 'Devalue, deal with your
money supply, cut wages and cut public expenditure
When the ¡MF told Britain 'Cut public expenditure
whatever the agonies we went through, it was saying
'Cut the rate of growth of your public expenditure:
But when one tells a developing country 'Cut public
expenditure one is giving it a prescription for nil or
negative growth, because only public expenditure can
finance the infrastructure needed for economic
development.
There is no profit in building schools and educating
children: no profit in hospitals and health services, in
the basic infrastructure that is necessaiyfordevelopment.
The IMF has consistently failed or refusedlam not
sure whichto understand this.
Ido not think that, with the best will in the world, the
¡MF will be capable of enough reform in its attitudes
to be able to do the new job that needs to be done.
Therefore, my predilection is to say, despite my dislike
of new institutions, that the ¡MF cannot do this job,
that somebody must, and that therefore we may need
a new sort of bridging institutionnot one with a
massive bureaucracy and the rest, but a new technique
that can enable the job to be done.
Dame Judith Hart
16 June 1980
cols 1290-92
We must persuade the OPEC countries to recycle
through institutions, and we must make those institutions
acceptable to them. We both want two things: we
want guarantees of oil production to the end of the
centun' and we want predictions of oil prices to the
end of the century to enable us to know with what we
have to cope. The OPEC countries want a means of
finding investment now that they cannot recycle through
commercial banks, and they want a means of getting
reasonable guarantees of that investment when it is
made. They have lost 25 per cent, in dollars, in five
years and they do not want to go thmugh that experience
again.
Ido not know what evidence there is that the OPEC
countries would not welcome a substitution account
as a way of getting rid of some of the dollars. My
evidence is that they would welcome such a course. It
would be possible to arrange for them to have a
packet of currencies that would spread the risk.
Another proposal is for the OPEC countries to invest
in bonds that could be used by the international
organisations for investment. They could be indexed
bonds, which would give the OPEC countries the
security that they want. There would be an outcry
from everybody else in the world, who would say 'Why
should they have the privilege of indexed bonds while
we do not? These are problems that have to be faced
if we want to influence OPEC policy. If we do not, let
us stand aside, and let the depression come and the
collapse that wi//follow it. If we are to deal with OPEC
we must be prepared to use imagination and to meet
its needs to a large extent.
We both need two things, and that is where the
dialogue should start.
With great respect, it is not enough to say that the
European Community stands ready to carry on a
dialogue. That is a negative approach. We need the
Seven to indicate that in specific ways they are prepared
to talk to OPEC and to overcome the enormous
scepticism and cynicism in the rest of the South about
the North, and to show them that the North is prepared
to do business. If the Seven indicate that willingness,
they may get a response from OPEC. We can make it
easier for them to meet thefr problems.
We must recognise that OPEC will require action that
will have an effect on the non-oil developing world.
This is where we come to the other part of the
package. It is similar to the transnational arrangement.
There wi//have to be some help with commoditiesand
some extra access for industrial goods. OPEC needs
the political support of the rest of the developing
world. It requires the votes of those countries in the
United Nations, especially on the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Unless it can maintain that position it will not do a deal
with us. If we are to be realistic, we must accept those
elements.
As for the other aspects of food and energy, a great
deal can be done at comparatively little expense.
Indeed, if we can overcome the reluctance of OPEC
to negotiate with us, 1 believe that it will share with us
in the expense of dealing with food and energy. That
will help both North and South to find alternative
resources for both and to develop food production.
Both courses of action are urgently necessary.
The first package must be to deal with the OPEC
surpluses jointly and to show the OPECcount ries that
we shall make institutional changes. We could even
set up afresh part of the International Monetary Fund
on which we could have the saine sort of representation
as we have on the International FundforAgricu Itu rai
Development, which is one-third North, one-third
OPEC and one-thfrd non-oil developing countries.
That they regardas aproper balance ofpower. Let us
develop that in whatever way we want forexpenditure
on new energy exploration and on new food production.
We shall then be able to make a start on dealing with
the problems.
I know that there is cynicism about dealing with the
problems in this way. They are global problems, and
they can be dealt with only by producing global
solutions. No country can deal with the problems on
its own. No country is able to deal with the recession
on its own. Europe cannot deal with it on its own, and
neither can the United States. That is the hard fact of
life. Therefore, there must be agreement and action.
The quicker we get that, the sooner we shall be able to
deal with the problem. Edward Heath
16 June 1980
cols 1186-88
We are told that we are the most hard line country and
that, had it not been for us, even the Americans at
Venice might have taken a different line. Germany,
which is supposed to be the third hard line country,
proposes to increase its aid by 8per cent a yeardouble
the rate of increase for its other public expenditure
programmes. Where does that leave us?Ishali not be
content, and this country should not be content, if
Britain, with its Commonwealth background. its
involvement in internationalism and its great
achievements in the past on the world scene is to be
laughed out of court as the most hard line, the least
understanding and the least prepared country to co-
operate in initiatives which are in its own interest and
in the interests of the world. Dame Judith Hart
12 December 1980
col 1922
There are arguments forand against limport controls!.
Ido not want to develop them now. However, there is
absolutely no argument whatever for imposing import
controls on the poor countries of the world.
Eric Deekins
16 June 1980
col 1812
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Brandt rightly warned that Ian open trade policy I will
be increasingly dftïcult in a recession and in a world
of rapid technological change.
We must be cautious in our trade policy. I do not
believe that the GA TTcovers the problem ola major
advanced technological industry being implanted in a
developing countn' when that industry is as advanced
as am' industry in the developed world. The textile
and shoe industries employ about I million people.
who cannot simply be written off. The adjustment
must be planned. Tom McNally
28 March 1980
cols 1882-83
I do not like protectionism, but there is a problem in
that respect. The trade unions ofthe free world have a
good record in terms of the liberalisation of trade and
developmentand tribute to that effect is paid in the
Brandt Reportbut they are genuinely concerned
when they witness substantial losses of markets and
employment in their own countries while working
conditions and wages in the many countries of the
developing world are held down by the exploitation of
unorganised and weak labour forces. particularly when
those abuses are practised by the same trade unionists'
employers in the Western world.
There is a particularly bad example of that in
international shipping. The growth of flags of
convenience is a supreme example of unfair labour
standards being practised; is a permissive attitude
towards international standa rds of safety, a degradation.
in too macv cases, ofproper working conditions, anda
denial of the right to belong to a trade union and to
organise collectively.
Those are matters to which the Government should
turn their attention, because we are a major shipping
nation. Instead, the Government deny that we have
any desire to stop the growth of flags of convenience
or are indifferent to that threat. The fact is that this
represents a major threat to us, as well as to standards
in the developing world.
It is not only trade unions that are concerned about
unfair health and safety standards affecting those
working in the developing world. The companies that
play by the rules and seek to establish and encourage
social progress are also being treated unfairly because
of the bad practices, since they have to face unfair
competition. The complacency of the Government in
such matters is mind boggling. Clinton Davis
12 December 1980
cols 1983-84
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The Lomé convention seems to be a clear example of
the way in which we frequently have dual standards.
in effect, the Lomé convention states that we should
seek a means of stabiising prices, especially in raw
materials and commodities generally. It has STABEX.
and it has at long last accepted that it should have the
rather inadequate scheme known as MINEX However
there is a realfear in my mind that we might give the
impression to the countries with which we deal that
our only interest in trying to stabilise commodity
prices is a personal one. ¡ am concerned that we
should seem to be saying to Third World countries 'As
we are already fairly well developed, and as we have a
continuing needforyour materials, when it suits us we
shall give you support so that we can import your raw
materials. However, when you begin to develop to the
point where you are exporting semi-manufactured or
manufactured goods, our response will be one of
horror. We shall close the barriers and ensure that you
do not have full access to our markets
Gwyneth Dunwoody
28 March 1980
col 1856
There are some who are impatient of calls/or Britain
to take a lead. . . I wish to put on record the strong
view of the Liberal Party that we not only have a duty
to take a lead but are in a unique position from which
to do so. The elements are well-known to the House
and I shall not dwell on them, but our unique colonial
tradition, long Commonwealth experience, good and
bad, the fact that we are u nique among developed
countries in having a hugestore of indigenous oil, our
enormous dependence on world trade, as evidenced
by the supremacy of the City of London in many
areas, and our constant need to find new markets all
put us in a unique position as regards responsibility
for leadership.
What worries me about the official British attitude is
the constantly expressed fear that if the iMF is
restructured not, of course, put under the control of
the United Nations on an inappropriate one-country-
one-vote basisto reflect the changing balance of
wealth in the world and if the World Bank is enabled
to take a more relaxed view of its responsibilities, it
would all be wildly inflationary.
¡ was impressed that just before his unfortunate death
the late Lord Armstrong, chairman of the Midland
Bank. strongly denied that, and said that there was no
reason why a skilfully managed substantial increase in
special drawing rights or the allocation of SDRs
specifically for development purposes should be
inflationary. My limited investigations show that we
are the only major power taking the negative line that
the whole problem has to be approached with plodding
caution at a hopelessly slow pace, because of/he fears
of inflation.
If that view is still the position of the Government, I
hope that the Minister will explain the reasoning
behind it. Do the Government feel, for example, that
in the relatively underdeveloped world in the South
there is a risk of immensely powerful trade unions
claiming a monopoly position and taking advantage of
new wealth to extract unjustified wage rises? That
would be an extraordinary picture of labour in the
developing world, but those who take the inflationary
view so seriously must account for what I believe is a
largely unju stified fear.
Jam sure that many of our fellow citizens accept thai
we should be among the last countries to be cutting
aid, taking a parochial view, pleading poverty and
adopting a static approach. After all, we owe an
enormous amount to the expansionary initiative of
Marshall Aid. We go to extravagant trouble with our
Common Market partners to protect ourproducers of
raw materials, yet, having shored up ourown agricultural
interests with all sorts of special protection and
arrangements, we still insist that most commodities
from the developing world must be exposed to all the
buffeting of unruly free market forces.
That is an unjustified position and I hope that the
Government will put their house in order, so that we
may cut a more respectable figure in the world and
before long assume a position of leadership in world
development. Richard Wainwrlght
12 December 1980
coIs 1928-29
Our problems are surely as of nothing compared with
the problems faced by the developing world. The fact
that i/is suffering far worse than we are is a reflection
of the world economic system in which there is an
unequal power relationship between the developed
and the developing world, between North and South.
It is a relationship in which the Third World is largely
a passive recipient of what the advanced countries
decide to give. We and the other OECD countries
bear that measure of responsibility here. We are living
in a state of near economic colonialism, born of the
fact that large sections of the developing world were
once ruled by the West.
It is evidenced in the pattern of trading relationships
that exists between the rich and the poor. The Third
World trades overwhelmingly with the advanced
countries 75 per cent of its trade is with OECD
countries. But for the advanced countries trade with
the Third World acounts for only a minor part of
their totaL Add to that the way in which the terms of
trade have affected many raw materials and the
producers of those raw materials, the volatility of the
price of raw materialscopper has been referred to in
the debatethe heavy unemployment that pervades
the developed world and the effect that has on markets
for the developing world, and bear in mind as well the
oil crisis, and one begins to realise the appalling
position of the developing countries and the failure of
the world economic system to cope with the problem.
Guy Barnett
12 December 1980
cols 1948-49
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